This week’s Sussex Philosophy Department ‘Work in Progress’ will host Christos Hadjioannou. Friday Fulton 114, 16.00-18.00.
Heidegger’s attempt to ground noein/categorial intuition in pathos
In Being and Time, fundamental moods enable Being-in-the-World as a whole to emerge, constitute intentional directedness in general, as well as the grasp of Being. Mood grounds metaphysical understanding. Heidegger insists that his phenomenological ontology relies on Husserlian and Aristotelian discoveries. He repetitively exalts Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition. And in ‘Being and Time’ he explicitly says that his rehabilitation of affects relies on Aristotle.
Indeed, Heidegger’s first (and only) detailed analysis of fear (the most important fundamental mood in Being and Time) prior to Being and Time is an interpretation of Aristotle. In Husserl and Aristotle, ontological grasp is ascribed to a particular kind of intuition that is not sensuous perception: in Husserl it is called categorial intuition, in Aristotle it’s called nous (intellect). But according to Heidegger, moods, which take on the same operation as categorial intuition and nous, are not a matter of intuition. In fact, Heidegger defines ‘affective knowing’ contra intuition/intellect. In this regard, Heidegger is incompatible with both Husserl and Heidegger.
But there is something perplexing. If that’s the case, how can he cite Aristotle and Husserl? In this paper, I will try to show how Heidegger’s turn to affects, and to fear in particular, is enabled by a particular interpretation of Aristotle- one inspired by Latin-Averroists.