(Οι σημειώσεις που έδωσα στο κοινό)
10 December 2010- Works-in-Progress-Presentation. Christos Hadjioannou.
Mood as kinetic concept in Heidegger (i.e. Mood as a principle of change).
1) Astonishment, as pathos, is the archē [the beginning] of philosophy.
2) Clearly, Heidegger ascribes to Comportment [Befindlichkeit] and Mood [pathos] a capacity to bear change.
3) Moods supply the binding necessity for a change, a genesis.
4) Mood is the sheer “thatness”. Comportment is more complex: it is the “how” we relate to our Mood.
5) Comportment and Mood are not two different self-subsistent entities. Rather, they are two aspects of the same Dasein. Each describes the same kinesis but from a different perspective. In other words: two kinetic perspectives.
6) Two kinetic perspectives, one ascribed to Mood as the pathos experienced by a subject (hypokeimenon), the other ascribed to neither a subject nor an object but “in-between” (diakeimenon). The former perspective, κινησις, belongs to πασχειν (παθος) which depends on the agent-patient paradigm that requires an “underlying subject” that suffers the change [μεταβολη] which accounts for homogeneous notion; rather “Being-in” as “in-between”, and accounts for heterogeneity, namely the emergence of contradictories (a real break in history; historicity without a history? Something out of Nothing? The call of conscience from Nothing? The call of conscience AS nothing?).
(Taking Mood as a clue for understanding becoming authentic in Heidegger)
- Main argument: Mood has a complex operation in Heidegger. It is not only disclosive but it is also kinetic. It is that which causes kinesis, in the expanded sense: locomotion, change, genesis, becoming.One operation is the celebrated ontological “disclosive operation” whereby a mood discloses the “there-ness” of the World, as a fundamental mode of Being-In-the-World. This operation undercuts the problem of skepticism since it posits the Dasein neither as a subject nor as an object, rather: in-between (Zwischen). This corresponds to the ontological existentiale Befindlichkeit.
- However, another, more basic operation is the kinetic operation, which is manifested as Stimmung [Mood], the ontic manifestation of Befindlichkeit [Comportment]. Stimmung is the pathos of Dasein. And Dasein always already has a pathos.
- Mood, Kinesis and Grammatical structures: Mood as pathos is tied to a passive affectedness that is requires a subject that undergoes the change. The origin of change comes from a transcending exterior. (“pathemata are homoiomata of pragmata in the world” Aristotle, On Interpretation). This is (I think) tied to the grammatical structure of passive voice [παθητικη διαθεση]. Befindlichkeit experienced authentically is not a subjective locus but lies “in-between” subject and object. This is (I think) tied to the grammatical structure of middle voice [μεση διαθεση].
* How does it compare to the way Kant and Hegel understood freedom (self-consciousness) in relation to the nature of Categories as self-generated spontaneously and independently by the “I”?